There exist numerous theories that attempt to explain the ubiquitous 99-cent price ending. Most of these theories either do not hold up to inspection or posit irrational consumers who serve as a money pump for firms. We offer an experimental test of Basu's (1997) rational expectations equilibrium model, an economic model of the phenomenon in which consumers are fully rational. We find ample support for Basu's model. Convergence to the 99-cent equilibrium is faster and more widespread when firms are able to observe the previous pricing decisions of others. By imitating the optimal 99-cent price endings of rational firms, less rational firms display an "as if" rationality.
Introduction
The ubiquity of price endings in 99 around the world is well documented. Brick-and-mortar stores and commercial internet sites alike employ price endings in 99 for almost every conceivable item. In the marketing literature, theories offering explanations for this pricing phenomenon abound. However, many of these theories don't hold up to inspection. The remainder posit irrational consumers. One such form of irrationality involves consistently ignoring or truncating the last two digits of the price, treating them as "00". This type of behavior results in consumers purchasing more units than they otherwise would.
For these reasons economists have recently developed alternative explanations for prices ending in 99. These explanations are coherent and do not rely on irrational consumers.
One such explanation is a rational expectations model developed by Basu (1997) . In Basu's model, consumers do not bother to examine or take into account the last two digits of the price when contemplating how many units of a good to buy. Rather, through either experience or the unwitting collection of this information, consumers know the mean of the distribution of the last two digits of all prices of goods they might possibly purchase. For every good, consumers simply assume that the last two digits of the price are equal to the mean cent choice. Thus, the consumer decides how many units of a good to buy based on the actual dollar component of the good's price and the average cent component of all relevant goods in the market. Notice that this consumer is, on average, correct about the cent component of the price.
Given this type of consumer behavior and a large number of goods on the market, each supplied by a monopolist, any individual monopolist may change the cent component it charges without affecting the overall average. Thus, each monopolist has an individual incentive to charge the maximum number of cents, 99, since doing so doesn't change the quantity demanded of its product. In the unique Nash equilibrium, all monopolists choose 99 cents. The consumer in this model is not duped: his assumption that the cent component of the price on each good he purchases is not only correct on average, it is precisely accurate for all goods he purchases since all goods are priced exactly at 99 cents. And herein lies the 1 appeal of Basu's model.
In this paper, we offer an experimental test of Basu's model. Subjects in our experiments represent price-setting monopolists. Each monopolist faces a demand function and a constant marginal cost. Subjects are monopolists in the sense that there is no substitution between their goods and no price competition between them. Nonetheless, just as in Basu's model, each monopolist's demand depends on the cent choices of other monopolists. Specifically, the quantity demanded of each monopolist's product is a function of the actual dollar amount it charges and the average of all cent components charged by all monopolists in the market. To minimize the impact of any individual monopolist's cent choice on the overall average and to give the 99-cent Nash equilibrium its best chance for success, we created relatively large markets, consisting of 26 monopolists on average. Essentially, we ask whether firms are able to reach the 99-cent equilibrium, given the assumed form of consumer behavior.
Rendering Basu's static model amenable to laboratory testing raises several interesting issues. Since we cannot reasonably expect all subjects to arrive immediately at the 99-cent equilibrium, we repeat the experiment for 10 periods. A question arises concerning the feedback with which to provide subjects between periods. We design two treatments: in the no-price-revelation treatment, each monopolist observes its own profit from the period. This allows subjects to compare their price and profit choices from the previous two periods and to adjust their cent choices in the direction that appears profitable. In the price-revelation treatment, in addition to observing their own period profit, subjects observe the prices of all other subjects. This allows for imitation.
Our experiment resembles a public-goods game. Each subject has a dominant cent choice of 99 cents. However, by choosing 99 cents, a subject increases the average cent choice thereby reducing the quantity sold by other monopolists. Choosing a lower cent component can be likened to investing in the public good. Under certain parameterizations of this game, the social optimum occurs when each subject sets his monopoly price.
The 99-price-ending phenomenon is economically important for two reasons. First, during our lifetimes, we, as consumers, purchase hundreds of thousands of goods whose prices end in 99. If we are oblivious to the last two digits of the price, treating them as "00" as some of the marketing explanations claim, then we are overconsuming; that is, we are purchasing (weakly) more units of these goods than we desire according to our demand curves. What is more, firms have tapped into one of the most persistently profitable pricing strategies.
Firms' ability to extract such rents from willing consumers surely deserves our attention as economists whose cornerstone is rational economic behavior.
Second, models of strategic firm behavior focus on market structure, the relative timing of competing firms' decisions, and whether firms choose prices or quantities. Monopoly, Bertrand, Cournot and Stackelberg solutions are among the possible outcomes that emerge as a function of the realizations of these variables. Given firms' profit functions, all of these models make precise price and quantity predictions. Yet the ubiquity of price endings in 99 imply that all of these models are inaccurate to at least the last two digits of the price prediction.
In the next section, we examine explanations from the marketing and economics literatures for the 99-pricing phenomenon. We also lay out Basu's model more fully. In section 3, we show how we adapted Basu's model to the laboratory. Section 4 details the experimental procedures. The experimental results follow in section 5. Section 6 examines individual subjects' pricing behavior. Section 7 suggests directions for future research to test the external validity and robustness of our results. Section 8 concludes with some broader implications of these experiments for pricing behavior and the design of economic institutions.
Possible Explanations for Pricing in the 9's 2.1 Explanations involving Consumer Irrationality
The marketing literature offers numerous explanations for the phenomenon it refers to as the "odd-pricing strategy" (see e.g., Evans and Berman, 1994, or Wilkie, 1990 This explanation may indeed be part of the historical reason for the introduction of 99-cent price endings. At the beginning of the century, as store owners began to allow their employees to run their stores, they needed a means to ensure that the employees would place the money from purchases in the cash register (rather than in their pockets). The 99-cent price ending was an ingenious way to solve this principal-agent problem between store owner and employee.
This motivation to charge 99 cents seems less relevant today. The vast majority of purchases are necessarily recorded because either the failure do so would trigger the electronic theft alarm upon exiting the store or they are paid for by credit or debit cards.
Interestingly, this explanation leads to the testable hypothesis that 99-cent endings should be less prevalent in owner-operated stores, as well in e-commerce, mail-order catalogues and other businesses in which purchases are not paid for by cash. This theory does not hold up well to inspection. Firstly, in countries such as Israel in which the smallest unit of currency is a 5-agorot coin, it is impossible to return 1 agora.
Consumers like to
Notwithstanding, prices ending in 99 agorot are widely observed in Israel. The cashier always rounds up the customer's payment to the nearest shekel so that no change is received at all, contradicting the hypothesized motive for pricing with 99.
Secondly, in 45 out of 50 U.S. states, plus the District of Columbia, a state sales tax 2 We present here a few of the most highly cited and more plausible explanations. There are many others related to product image (see Schindler, 1991) and the attractiveness of the double nines (see Wilkie, 1990) that seem less plausible. Shtudiner (2001) provides a very thorough survey.
ranging from three percent (Colorado) to seven percent (Mississippi and Rhode Island) is added on to the sticker price. In Canada, a federal sales tax is applied to the sticker price in all 10 provinces and three territories in addition to varying provincial sales in six of the provinces. Thus, setting a pre-tax price that ends in 99 does not minimize the amount of post-tax change returned to the customer. Thirdly, an ever increasing number of purchases are made via credit or debit so that no money is exchanged and no change is given. Gabor and Granger, 1964; Wilkie, 1990, p. 274 ).
Impression of a Discount
We would argue that this last argument has the most intuitive appeal. It likely provides a partial explanation for price endings in 99. Nonetheless, for an economist, this explanation is unsavory. It implies irrational consumers who are continually fooled. A possible retort is that whether the price ends in 99, 49, 15 or 0 is immaterial to the consumer. The mental cost of concerning oneself with the number of cents after the decimal place exceeds any benefit gained in adjusting one's demand more optimally in accordance with the precise number of cents.
However, just as rounding up to 99 can make a substantial difference in the price-setting firm's revenue from its aggregate sales, so the volume of purchases the typical consumer makes during a lifetime would seem to portray him as a money pump for the firm. What makes this story particularly unappealing is the consumer's ability to overcome easily his susceptibility to deceit. For instance, by reading the price of an item from right to left, the 5 consumer increases the saliency of the cent component of the price.
Economic Explanations
The pricing in the nines phenomenon has recently drawn the attention of economists. In a differentiated products model, Shy (2000) shows that if the transportation costs are at least $1, then firms will choose a 99-cent price ending in the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. Anderson and Simester (2003) develop a model in which price endings in $9 serve an informational role, signaling to uninformed consumers which prices are low compared to others. They show both theoretically and through the results of a mail-order experiment that $9 price endings actually increase the demand for products compared to price endings in smaller numbers.
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This effect however is moderated by the number of products with $9 endings. Basu (1997) arrives at an equilibrium price ending of 99 in which both consumers and firms hold rational expectations of the price. It is Basu's model upon which we focus and describe in detail in the next section.
Rational Expectations Explanation
Basu ( The key assumption in Basu's model is that consumers know the mean of the distribution φ(C). The consumer may have actively sought this price information, collected it more casually through browsing or window shopping or he may have unwittingly acquired it through experience. One plausible way in which the consumer may unwittingly come to know the average of firms' cent choices is by emptying his pockets of coins at the end of the day, counting them and dividing by the number of purchases made that day. In contemplating how many units of good i to purchase, it is assumed that a consumer looks at D i but does not waste effort looking at C i ; instead he simply assumes that C i equals the mean value of C. In making such an assumption, the consumer is, by definition, on average correct. Given that there may be some cost to paying attention to, processing and remembering, the precise C i attached to each good, this could be a perfectly rational way of thinking.
If all consumers behave in this manner, then the demand for good i priced at (
, whereC is the mean of the distribution φ(·). The assumption that there are thousands of firms means that the impact of any one firm onC is negligible. 4 It follows that for each firm the optimal choice of C i is 99. Hence, each firm i chooses a price equal
) for all non-negative integers D i . As a result, the unique Nash equilibrium price profile that prevails in the market is given by {(
All firms choose the 99-cent price ending. Thus, the average cent component is 99.
Consumers know this and decide upon their number of purchases for each good i according , 99) ). The consumer still only looks at D i and simply assumes that C i takes its expected value. Indeed, in equilibrium, the consumer's expectation is not merely correct on average, it accurately describes the prices for all goods, since no monopolist will charge a 4 In actual fact, the assumption of "thousands of goods" is more restrictive than it needs to be. Basu really only needs enough goods such that pricing at 99 cents is firm i's dominant cent choice, for all i. In our experimental setup, two goods are sufficient for 99 cents to be firm i's dominant choice, i = 1, 2. It is worth noting that 99 cents is also the dominant cent choice if the consumers observe the median or modal cent component of the price distribution, rather than the average, the logic being that as the number of monopolists grows large, the probability that any one monopolist will affect the median or the mode decreases to zero. Thus, each individual monopolist should set his cent component equal to 99 to maximize the price obtained per unit sold.
In this paper, we test whether, given the consumer behavior described in this model, producers are able to reach the unique 99-cent equilibrium. In the next section we present our experimental design and some of the interesting issues that arise in making this static model amenable to a laboratory test.
Experimental Design
One question regarding this model is whether consumers actually behave according to the assumption that they observe the mean cent choice of all of the goods they intend to purchase.
In section 7 we relate this assumption to recent cognitive psychology research showing the human visual system's ability to perceive quite accurately the mean of even diverse items in a set and its inability to retain information about the properties of individual items in the set. We also discuss a class of goods for which consumers base their purchases on the average choice of firms in the market, rather than an individual firm's choice. Moreover, we've already noted the model's robustness to other order statistics. Finally, the assumption of consumer behavior needn't be taken literally: it may be a simplification of some form of consumer behavior to reduce processing or storage costs. Beyond these justifications, we leave the issue of consumer price perceptions to future research. Instead, we focus on seller pricing behavior, given the assumed consumer behavior.
Subjects played the role of monopolists. Each subject received the identical set of instruc-tions (see Appendix A) with the sole difference being each subject's linear demand curve and constant marginal cost. Subjects were explained that the quantity they sold would be deter- these in all possible ways yields the ten different sets of parameters (also to be referred to as "subtreatments") used in these experiments and displayed in Table 1 . Each subtreatment is associated with a different dominant strategy, to be discussed below.
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the ten parameter subtreatments. We calibrated the parameters and the experimental exchange rate such that if all subjects choose their dominant-strategy price, they all earn similar per period profits. In the unique Nash equilibrium, all subjects assigned to the odd subtreatments (rows 1, 3, 5, 7 and 9 in Table 1 Table 1 : Experimental parameters and outcomes for the ten different combinations of the linear demand curves (column 2) and constant marginal cost (column 3). The ordinary monopoly price is shown in column 4 along with the monopolist's Nash equilibrium price in column 5. The parameters were calibrated such that if all subjects choose their strictly dominant price of (D i , 99), all subjects in the odd (even) subtreatments earn the identical equilibrium profit of 7.28 (7.99) shekels (column 6).
equals one NIS for odd (even) subtreatments.
In selecting the parameters, it is also important to provide subjects a significant incentive to choose both 99 cents and the optimal dollar component. With this in mind, we set the parameters such that if subject i chooses his monopoly price (see column 4 in Table   1 ) and all other subjects choose their dominant-strategy prices, then by switching to his dominant-strategy price, subject i increases his profit from 13. There are a number of other interesting issues involved in rendering Basu's static oneshot rational expectations model amenable to laboratory testing. It is not reasonable to expect all subjects to appreciate immediately that their dominant cent component is 99. A repeated game is thus required to allow for convergence to the 99-cent equilibrium. This 6 The reason that the Nash equilibrium per period profits of the even subjects were set slightly higher than those of the odd subjects (7.99 NIS versus 7.28 NIS) is to compensate them for the non-trivial task of arriving at the equilibrium dollar component.
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raises questions regarding the feedback to provide subjects after each repetition. At the very least, each subject needs to learn his own profit from the round. Having changed the cent component from one round to the next, a subject may compare his earnings in consecutive rounds and infer whether the cent change was profitable. This type of inference can however be misleading since a subject may increase the cent component of his price and earn less due to the offsetting effect of a more substantial increase in the overall average of cent choices.
In other words, by increasing his cent choice, the monopolist increases his price received on each unit sold; however, if other increase their cent choices by even more, then his quantity sold will decrease by more than his price increase and his earnings will fall.
We conducted a second treatment in which the sole addition was that subjects' pricing decisions were displayed at the end of the round to all subjects. This allows subjects who
have not yet arrived at 99 cents to observe the pricing decisions of others who have, thus enabling them to ponder whether the same price ending might be also appropriate for them.
To avoid possible demand effects, both the dollar and cent components of subjects' decisions were displayed in order not to draw attention exclusively to the cent component.
Experimental Procedures
The subject matter of this experiment limits our subject pool to those who are able to compute the monopoly price, since failure to do so in our experiments can lead to zero profits (if the dollar component is set above the demand curve's vertical axis intercept) or negative profits (if the price is set below marginal cost). Thus, we recruited subjects from classes with introductory microeconomics as a prerequisite. That students learned to solve for the monopoly outcome in introductory micro does not necessarily mean they remember it. For this reason, potential subjects were told that the experiment dealt with the subject of monopoly. Those who signed up were telephoned a day or two before the experiment to confirm their participation. During the phone conversation, they were told to bring a calculator and that they would be tested on their ability to compute the monopoly solution that they learned in introductory microeconomics; if they did not recall how to compute the monopoly solution, they were advised to review their lecture notes.
We made good on our promise to test subjects' understanding of the monopoly solution.
Upon arrival, students were seated and briefly instructed how to solve for the monopolist's price and quantity choices. More precisely, one of the authors derived in the most general terms the monopolist's first-order condition, showed them that the monopolist equates marginal revenue to marginal cost and proved that the marginal revenue curve has twice the slope of the demand curve, for linear demand curves. Subjects were then given a preliminary exercise to solve (see Appendix A, Preliminary Exercise). They were presented with one of two versions of a monopoly problem containing a linear demand curve and constant marginal cost. They were asked to solve for the monopolist's profit-maximizing price, quantity and profit. Once a subject had completed the monopoly exercise, he raised his hand. One of the experimenters checked his answer. If he had answered correctly, he was told that the experiment would begin shortly. If there was a mistake in any part of his solution, he was told that all or part of his answer was incorrect and was given additional time to correct his answer. Subjects unable to compute the full monopoly solution within a reasonable amount of time were excused from the experiment and paid a 15 NIS showup fee. Only three out of the total 264 subjects who showed up were in this category.
Those subjects who solved the preliminary exercise received a copy of the experimental instructions (see Appendix A, Instructions). After having read the instructions on their own, one of the experimenters read aloud the instructions. Questions were answered and a random example designed to illustrate the payoff structure of the game was performed.
The random example consisted of four imaginary monopolists numbered 31, 32, 33 and 34.
Monopolists 31 and 33 (32 and 34) faced the same set of parameters as those in version 1 (version 2) of the preliminary exercise. The dollar and cent decisions of these four imaginary subjects were randomly drawn, displayed to all participants and written on the board. One number representing the dollar-component decision was randomly drawn from a plastic bag for each of the imaginary subjects. Next, a number between 0 and 99 representing the cent-component decision was randomly drawn from another plastic bag for each of the four imaginary subjects. An experimenter computed aloud the average of the four cent decisions and showed subjects how the average was used to compute each imaginary subject's quantity sold and profit. Thus, the logic of consumer behavior and the monopolist profit calculation in the random example was just like that in the experiment. Unlike the experiment, the prices in the example were purposefully randomly determined to avoid providing unintended cues to subjects. Along these same lines, the demand and cost parameters and the monopoly and equilibrium price and quantity solutions bear no resemblance to any of the 10 subtreatments (as can be seen by comparing Versions 1 and 2 of the Preliminary Exercise in the Appendix with the experimental parameters and solutions displayed in Table 1 ).
The dominant cent choice is the same for all monopolists in these experiments, namely, choose 99 cents in all periods. This poses the risk that subjects in a given session may reveal details of the experimental design or, for those who understood it, the solution itself to students participating in a subsequent experiment. Although Ben-Gurion University has a relatively large student body with more than 15,000 undergraduate students, more than 90% of whom live off campus, there is still the risk that classmates participating in different sessions may discuss the experiment. We adopted several measures to prevent this form of subject pool contamination. For example, whenever more than one session was conducted on a particular class (as in the case of the first-year and second-year economics majors), we scheduled the sessions so that they overlapped. The first of the two sessions began at, say, 15:00. The second session we scheduled for 17:00 in a different computer classroom, on a different floor of the building or a different building altogether. Thus, the students in the second session began the experiment before those in the first session had completed their session. This prevented the two groups from communicating. Along these same lines, we requested all students to turn off their mobile phones. This way one friend, just having completed the experiment, could not call another friend in the second experiment to report on the experiment -an admittedly paranoid, but effective precaution.
We conducted a total of 10 experiments, five in each treatment. The subjects were stu-dents in economics (labeled "econ" in all subsequent tables), accounting ("accg") , industrial management ("ind ") and business management ("bus "). Between 16 and 31 monopolists participated in each experiment. In total, 261 subjects participated, each in one experiment
only. An entire experiment required between two and two and a half hours. The average earnings were 84.7 NIS including a 10 NIS participation payment. 
Results

No-Price-Revelation Treatment
We begin by focusing on the five experiments in which the only feedback subjects received between rounds was their private profits. Figure 1 displays the average cent component by round for each of these five experiments. Figure 2 shows the fraction of subjects who chose 99 cents by round for each experiment.
[insert Figures 1 and 2 here]
Notice, first of all, from Figure 1 that the average cents in period 1 in all sessions is greater than 50, the average cent component of monopoly prices (20 and 80 cents) over all subjects. This observation suggests that in every session several subjects understood from the outset that 99 is the optimal cent choice. Figure 2 reveals that initially between 20%
and 32% of subjects in a session selected 99 cents.
Both figures also reveal a learning process in all five sessions. The average cent component and the fraction of subjects who chose 99 steadily increased over the ten periods in each experiment. A notable exception to these increasing trends is period 5 in experiment n29ind.
In period 4, the average cent component jumped from 66 to 81. This sudden increase meant that the profits of numerous subjects fell, even though they had increased their cent choice. Many such subjects reasoned that their cent increase was unprofitable; they therefore decreased their cent choice in period 5, precipitating the sharp drop in the average cent choice. 8 Similarly, the drop in the average cent component in period 6 of experiment n30econ follows a sharp increase in period 5.
Overall, these five experiments show movement in the direction of convergence to 99 cents. By period 10, between 33% and 77% arrived at 99 cents, depending on the session.
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And while the session average of the cent component ranged between 52.6 to 63 cents in period 1, the period 10 range was 80.9 and 96 cents.
To make more precise the convergence process in each session, we employ the AshenfelterEl-Gamal dynamic regression model (Noussair et al., 1995) . We model each subject's cent choice in each period, C it , as a function of 1/t and
. The model takes the following functional form:
The term D j is a dummy variable that assumes a value of 1 for experiment j, and 0 otherwise.
According to the specification, in period 1 (t = 1), the price in experiment j equals B 1j . This . The term B 2j can thus be thought of as the price asymptote for experiment j. The random error term u it is distributed normally with mean zero.
Regression (1) of Table 2 displays the regression coefficients for the five no-price-revelation sessions (White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses). The coefficients B 1j and B 2j are the initial-price and convergence-price terms, respectively, for the experiment labeled j. The experiment name consists of three components: a letter ("n" or "p") referring to either the no-price or price-revelation treatment; the number of subjects in the experiment; and their field of study. 8 This type of directional learning is explored further in section 6 where we examine the behavior of individual subjects. 9 The tendency to price at 99 cents in period 10 is the same in the odd (45/70 subjects) and even subtreatments (44/70 subjects). Table 2 : Regression results from the Ashenfelter-El-Gamal dynamic linear regression model. The coefficients B 1j and B 2j refer to the initial price and convergence price terms, respectively, for experiment j, where ("n") "p" indicates the (no-) price-revelation treatment. Columns (1) and (3) display the results from the "n" treatment only and the combined "n" and "p" treatments, respectively. B 2,n is the common convergence term for the "n" sessions and B p is the additional measure of convergence for the "p" sessions. (White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses.) Column (2) tests whether the convergence asymptotes equal 99 for the "n" treatment. Table 2 gives the results of an F-test of the null hypothesis that B 2j equals 99. In all but one experiment (n27ind ), we can reject this hypothesis at the 5% level. For the experiment n27ind we can reject it at the 10% level.
We define the notion of partial convergence as the case in which the convergence asymptote, B 2j , is closer to the model's prediction than to the corresponding initial price estimate,
. 10 By this definition, all five experiments exhibit partial convergence.
In short, all five sessions show considerable progress the 99-cent equilibrium over the 10 periods; however, none of them converged unambiguously. The absence of unequivocal convergence on both the session and individual subject levels led us to design a second treatment. This second treatment is identical to the first one, with the addition that the previous price decisions (dollar and cent components) of all other subjects are made observable to all subjects.
Price-Revelation Treatment
We conducted five experiments on economics (econ), accounting (accg) and business (bus ) majors. Figure 3 shows the average cent component by period for each of the five pricerevelation sessions. The figure reveals that for this treatment the period 10 average cent choice ranged from 88.6 to 97.7 cents, with four of the five sessions above 94 cents. Figure 4 displays the fraction of subjects who chose 99 cents in each period according to session. By period 10, between 59% and 87% priced at 99 cents. A comparison of Figure 4 with Figure 2 reveals that a higher fraction of subjects learned to price at 99 cents in the price-revelation is. In all of our experiments, this holds trivially. We thus introduce partial convergence as an intermediate measure between weak convergence and strong convergence. Another simple way to see the effect of displaying prices to subjects is to compare their period 1 and period 10 cent choices. We may compare the proportions of monopolists in the two treatments who chose higher, lower and the same cent choices in period 10 as in period 1. We are able to reject the null hypothesis that the fractions of subjects who raised, lowered and did not change their prices across the two treatments are the same at the 1% level, χ 2 (2) = 9.73, p = .01, test of proportions. The most striking difference between the treatments is the negligible proportion of monopolists who lowered their cent choice in the "p" treatment (3/121) compared to more than 10% (15/140) in the "n" treatment.
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To obtain a quantitative estimate of the additional impact of price revelation on subjects' cent choices, we conduct the Ashenfelter-El-Gamal regression on all observations from all 10 sessions. We assume that all sessions converge to the same period 10 price, B 2,n , and add a dummy variable, D p , equal to one for price-revelation sessions, and zero otherwise. The coefficient B p therefore measures the additional degree of convergence in the price-revelation sessions. Equation (2) displays the regression specification:
The results displayed in (3) in Table 2 establish that overall the five sessions from the no-price-revelation treatment converge to 88.16 cents. The convergence term for the pricerevelation treatment, B p , is about five cents higher (p=.001).
In sum, we have seen in both treatments that through repetition and feedback many subjects arrive at the 99-cent equilibrium. Moreover, additional feedback in the form of observing the distribution of prices of all subjects increases the trend toward convergence to this equilibrium.
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11 Note that in accordance with their substantially higher monetary incentive to do so (see page 11), the fraction of even subjects who reached 99 cents (49/59) is higher than the odd subjects (33/62), χ 2 (1) = 3.11, p = .08. 12 One might surmise that the trend toward 99 would be even more complete had we allowed permitted the experiments to continue for a few more rounds. Certainly prices rise through period 7. Beginning in period 8, however, Figures 1 and 3 show a flattening out of cent choices. To test whether more rounds might promote more complete convergence, we allowed two of the ten sessions (one in each treatment) to run for 15
periods. The evidence is inconclusive. In one experiment, n30econ2 , the average cent choice and the number of subjects who chose 99 cents both increased in period 15 compared to period 10, while the other session, p25bus, registered a four-cent drop and two fewer subjects who posted 99 cents in period 15 compared to period 10.
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Up to this point, we have examined the degree of convergence of the different experimental sessions and treatments. We now turn to the means by which these sessions converge by exploring more closely the behavior of individual subjects and their responses to the betweenperiod feedback. Tables 3 and 4 display individual subjects' prices and profits from one "n" session (n30econ2 ) and a similar "p" session (p31econ), respectively, for all ten periods.
These experiments are of similar size (30 vs. 31 subjects) and both consist of second-year undergraduate economics students. What is more, the first-period cent average is approximately 63 cents in both sessions. However, the price-revelation session converges toward the 99-cent equilibrium more quickly and more fully.
[insert Tables 3 and 4 For those subjects who did not immediately recognize that their dominant cent decision is 99, an examination of their prices and their responsiveness to profit feedback (and others' prices in treatment "p") allows us to discern between at least two types of subjects.
The most common type of behavior is directional learning (Selten and Stoecker, 1996).
Directional learners compare their price choices and resultant profits from previous periods and adjust their current period price in the direction that appears profitable. In experiment and 7 undoubtedly left the subject at a loss. At his wit's end, the subject allowed the modal pricing decision of other monopolists of 99 cents to inform his period 8 choice and stuck with this choice through the duration.
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More generally speaking, we observed three broad patterns of behavior in these experiments: subjects who immediately understood their optimal cent choice, those who learned to and those who never did. Within this last group, there are those who never will and those who might be helped by increased feedback.
Discussion of Future Research
Our results provide considerable support for Basu's rational expectations explanation of 99-cent price endings. No doubt augmenting subjects' between-round feedback would facilitate even more complete convergence to the 99-cent equilibrium.
14 In this section, we will focus on two directions for future research aimed at testing the external validity and robustness of Basu's model.
Having shown that sellers arrive at 99-cent price endings with repetition and the appropriate kind of feedback, the remaining question concerns the realism of the hypothesized 13 That this subject copied the modal choice of other subjects is supported by the subject's own words.
In response to the question, "Did the display of cent choices at the end of each round affect your choice of cent component? If so, explain how," on the post-experiment questionnaire, the subject wrote, "yes, I chose according to the majority choice of other participants." 14 For instance, in addition to displaying other monopolists' prices, their concurrent profits could also be displayed. This would allow confused subjects to identify and imitate those pricing strategies that are most profitable. Alternatively, Pingle and Day (1996) suggest that the "follow authority" mode of behavior may be effective when decision makers make poor decisions and the authority is, for example, an expert. This suggests a treatment in which the identity numbers of all subjects are known to all monopolists and a few of the subjects are "experts" (e.g., outstanding peer students, graduate students or economics professors).
As in the price-revelation treatment, all prices are revealed at the end of each round according to identity number, thereby allowing imitation of these authorities.
consumer behavior compared to the more common assumption that consumers simply ignore the cent component altogether. Recently, an analogous debate has emerged in the cognitive psychology literature on the perception and representation of multiple items in a set.
Given the visual system's limited capacity for information processing, when the individual views many items at a time, the traditional approach suggests that low-resolution information about each item is encoded; namely, the visual system represents each item with fewer bits of information (Neisser, 1967; Nakayama, 1990 ). This approach can be likened to the psychological models of price endings in which consumers select a lower resolution of each item's price when faced with a large number of items; namely, they accurately encode the dollar component of the price and ignore the cent component.
Ariely (2001) One could adapt this experimental paradigm to test directly consumers' price percep-tions. Consider a setup in which each subject is shown a set of numbers (prices) between 0 and 99. The subject subsequently sees two numbers and is asked, among other things, which one belongs to the set of previously displayed numbers and whether each number is larger or smaller than the set's mean number. While such a test is likely to be of greater interest to cognitive psychologists than economists, we propose it here to illustrate that our hypothesized consumer behavior is testable and, as suggested by Ariely's and Chong and
Treisman's results, even plausible.
There is an entire class of goods for which the consumer may not observe the decisions of specific firms, but may have some idea about the average firm decision: experience goods (Nelson, 1970) require that the consumer actually consume the good before being able to assess its quality. However, even if the consumer hasn't tried a particular good, he may have a good idea about the average firm quality decision through reputation, word-of-mouth or experience. We make grocery shopping decisions on the basis of the average quality of similar items all of the time. We observe a new or unfamiliar brand (be it orange juice from concentrate, canned peas or potato chips) and decide how many units to purchase based on the good's price and the perceived average quality of goods of this type. When booking a holiday vacation package to a distant location, one may be well aware that hotels in the region are of a certain quality, despite not knowing the quality of the particular hotel included in the vacation package. Thus, one bases one's decision regarding how many nights to stay on the average hotel quality in the region, rather than the individual hotel's unobservable choice.
One could easily reformulate our experimental game in terms of monopoly firms who decide on the level of quality they choose each round. The consumer demand for an individual good is determined by the firms' average quality choice. If quality choice is costly, then it should converge toward the unique Nash equilibrium in which each firm offers the lowest possible quality.
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Conclusions
Economic theory predicts that firms will arrive at the competitive, Bertrand-Nash, CournotNash, Stackelberg-Nash or monopoly price, depending on the market structure and strategy space available to firms. The ubiquitous 99 cents price ending testifies to the fact that in selecting the final price some tinkering or "rounding" occurs. This paper shows that under particular assumptions about consumer behavior, firms are capable of responding optimally and adjusting their prices to maximize profits given the constraints that consumer price perceptions place upon them.
Still, we observed numerous subjects unable to arrive at the optimal 99-cent price ending.
In some cases, their round-profit was a source of misleading feedback, which obstructed them from reaching the 99-cent price ending. However, with additional feedback in the form of displaying all subjects' prices, imitation was possible and a larger fraction of subjects reached the optimal price ending. More generally, the right kind of feedback and institutional design can overcome irrationality so that individuals' decisions reflect an "as if" rationality.
[ 
Appendix: Forms Preliminary Exercise
Version 1
The demand curve faced by the monopolist is given by, P=132.7-13.7Q
and the marginal cost is constant and given by, MC=119.
Compute the price and quantity that maximize the monopolist's profit.
Monopoly Price
Monopoly Quantity Monopoly Profit .
Version 2
The demand curve faced by the monopolist is given by, P=92.7-7.4Q
and the marginal cost is constant and given by, MC=72.
Monopoly Price Monopoly Quantity Monopoly Profit . 
Instructions
This is an exercise in individual decision-making. Read the following instructions carefully until you fully understand the exercise. A full understanding is important in this exercise to avoid unintended financial losses. Because your are meant to make your decisions individually, it is important that you refrain from talking aloud during the entire exercise. If at any stage you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to assist you.
In this exercise, you will act as a monopolist in a market for a particular product. The demand curve for your product is given by: P = 20.60 − 0.22Q. Your marginal cost for producing this product is constant and given by: MC = 17. As a monopolist, your task is to choose a price for your product. In the room with you, there are 29 additional participants in this exercise. Each one of them acts as monopolist in a different market. (In total, there are 30 monopoly firms in this economy where a different student participant represents each monopolist.) It is important to note that not every monopolist possesses the same demand curve and the same marginal cost.
The price that you are to choose consists of two components: a dollar component and a cent component. The consumers are simulated and behave according to the following logic: due to limited time and limited storage space in their memories, consumers do not exert effort observing the cent component of the price that you chose. When they look at the price of your product, they see the dollar component that you chose. However, the cent component that they see is the average of the 30 cent components chosen by the monopolists in this economy. (Somehow, the consumers anticipate correctly the average cent component and observe this instead of your specific cent-component choice.)
The quantity of your product that consumers purchase is determined by this price (they substitute this price into their demand curve for your product, given above). However, the price that you will be paid for each unit sold is the true price that you selected (the dollar component that you chose and the cent component that you chose).
After reading the instructions, you must decide upon a dollar and cent component you wish to charge, and enter your choices in the appropriate place on your screen. (Please type all cent components as two-digit numbers.) Also, after deciding, write your chosen dollar and cent components on your personal record sheet. After all participants have entered their decisions, your profit will appear on the screen. Your profit is calculated according to the above demand curve and marginal cost. Also write your profit on your personal Record Sheet. ["p" treatment: In addition to observing your own profit after all participants have entered their decisions, a table displaying the decisions of all participants (including your own) will be displayed on your screen.] This exercise will repeat itself 10 times. In each of the 10 repetitions (rounds), you will face the same demand curve and marginal cost. At the end of the exercise, you will be paid 50% of your accumulated profits from the 10 rounds (i.e., 2 units of profit in the exercise = 1 NIS) plus a 10 NIS show-up fee in cash.
["p" treatment: The table displaying the decisions of all participants is updated at the end of each round.] You may return to the decisions from previous rounds by pressing the labeled button below the table.
Before beginning the exercise, an experimenter will read aloud the instructions to all participants. Then, an experimenter will solve with you a random example based on 4 imaginary monopolists in order that everyone will fully understand the exercise. subject subtr. eqm price price 1 profit 1 price 2 profit 2 price 3 profit 3 price 4 profit 4 price 5 profit 5 price 6 profit 6 price 7 profit 7 price 8 profit 8 price 9 profit 9 price 10 profit 10 Table 3 : Price choices and profits in all 10 periods for experiment n 30 econ 2 . Each row indicates the subject's subtreatment, corresponding equilibrium price, and price choice and resultant profit labeled for each of the 10 periods. The average cent choice for each period appears in the bottom row. If the subject chose the full equilibrium price (dollar and cent components), the price is darkly shaded in. If the subject chose the equilibrium cent choice only, the price is lightly shaded in.
